This paper explains why payment card networks charge fees that are proportional to the transaction values instead of charging fixed per-transaction fees. We show that, when card networks and merchants both have market power, card networks earn higher profits by charging proportional fees. It is also shown that competition among merchants reduces card networks' gains from using proportional fees relative to fixed per-transaction fees. Merchants are found to earn lower profits under proportional fees whereas consumer utility and social welfare are higher. Our welfare results are then evaluated with respect to the current regulatory policy debates.
Introduction
Credit and debit cards have become an important part of our payment system and they affect a large portion of the consumer and merchant populations. Recent Federal Reserve studies found that 80.2% of the U.S. consumers have debit cards and 78.3% have credit cards. In a typical month, 31.0% of consumer payments are paid for with debit cards, and 21.3% with credit cards (Foster et al., 2009 ). In 2006, debit cards were used in 25.3 billion transactions for a total value of $1.0 trillion, and credit cards were used in 21.7 billion transactions for a total value of $2.1 trillion (Gerdes, 2008) .
Along with this development, some controversy has emerged because merchants are critical of the card fees, challenging both the fee structure and the level. 1 This has generated heated debates among researchers, practitioners and policymakers in recent years. On the research side, a large body of literature, called "two-sided market theory,"
has been developed to evaluate payment card market competition and pricing issues. Similar trends are also taking place in many other countries. More than 20 countries and areas around the world have started regulating or investigating card fees. 3 There are several main issues at the heart of the card fee controversy. For example, should card issuers be allowed to collectively set merchant (interchange) fees? How do the resulting fee levels correspond to social optimum? Why are these fees proportional to the transaction values rather than fixed per-transaction fees? While the academic literature 1 Recently, there have been more than 50 lawsuits filed by merchants and merchant associations against card networks and card issuers regarding merchant card fees. Many of the recent lawsuits have been consolidated in an ongoing case before the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of New York. 2 For example, Baxter (1983) , Katz (2001) , Schmalensee (2002) , Tirole (2002, 2003) , Gans and King (2003) , Wright (2003 Wright ( , 2004 , Schwartz and Vincent (2006) , McAndrews and Wang (2008) , Rysman (2009) and Wang (2010a Wang ( , 2010b . 3 The countries and areas that have taken actions on merchant (interchange) fees include Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, European Union, France, Israel, Mexico, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey. Other countries that have started investigating merchant (interchange) fees include Brazil, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa and United Kingdom (Bradford and Hayashi, 2008) . has so far focused on the collective setting and level of merchant (interchange) fees, this paper solves the puzzle why card networks charge proportional fees.
There are four types of general purpose payment cards in the United States: Credit cards, charge cards, signature debit cards and PIN debit cards. Charge cards are similar to credit cards, except that they require cardholders to pay off full charges every month.
Signature debit cards and PIN debit cards do not extend credit to cardholders. Instead, they debit the cardholder's bank account right after each transaction. 4 The first three types of cards are routed over the credit card networks and charge fees that are proportional to the transaction values. 5 In contrast, PIN debit cards are routed over the PIN debit networks, which used to charge fixed per-transaction fees. However, in recent years, PIN debit cards have been shifting to the proportional fee model, though typically with a cap.
6 Figure 1 shows the average total fees that merchants pay for accepting various payment cards. These fees are often referred to as the "merchant discount," and a large portion of the merchant discount comes from interchange fees, paid by merchants to card issuers through merchant acquirers. The fees for credit card transactions are the highest, followed by the fees for signature debit cards and PIN debit cards. On average, merchants pay about 1.75-2.41% of the transaction value for accepting signature debit cards and credit cards, and 0.62% for accepting PIN debit cards. These fees generate significant revenue for card service providers. In 2008, U.S. merchants paid $60.9 billion in merchant discount 4 Debit card payments are typically authorized either with a PIN or by the cardholder's signature. In terms of transaction volume, signature debit cards account for 60 percent of debit transactions, and PIN debit cards account for 40 percent. 5 Visa and MasterCard are the two major credit card networks in the United States. They provide card services through member financial institutions (card issuers and merchant acquirers), and account for 80 percent U.S. credit card market share. These two networks are also the sole providers of signature debit cards, with Visa holding 75 percent market share and MasterCard holding 25 percent. 6 There are 14 major PIN debit networks in the United States. The proportional fees on PIN debit transactions started in 1996 by Interlink for non-supermarket transactions. Star Card networks have often argued that the reason why they impose proportional fees stems from the costs they bear from processing card transactions and providing "payment guarantee" services. However, empirical evidence suggests that the cost components cannot explain the merchant fees commonly set at the 1-3% level for brand name cards. 7 Particularly, debit cards do not provide credit float and bear very small fraud risk, so there appears to be no cost basis for charging proportional fees. In fact, the PIN debit networks used to work well (some are still working) by charging fixed per-transaction fees. In many other countries, fixed per-transaction fees are the norm for debit cards. 8 Therefore, a natural question to ask is why U.S. card networks charge proportional fees.
In this paper we demonstrate that the "double marginalization" market structure pro- 7 For example, industry studies show that the average net fraud losses to card issuers are 0.08% for credit cards, 0.05% for signature debit cards and 0.01% for PIN debit cards. 8 vides the major explanation for this puzzle. Viewing card markets and merchant markets as vertically related, we find that upstream card networks can better restrain the market power of downstream merchants by charging proportional fees. As a result, card networks earn higher profits by charging proportional fees compared with fixed per-transaction fees. Using a simple model, we also investigate how changing the degree of competition among merchants affects card networks' gains from proportional fees relative to fixed pertransaction fees. Finally, we investigate and compare merchant profits, consumer utility and social welfare under the two types of fees.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a simple model of a card network, merchants, and consumers. Section 3 solves for the proportional card fees which maximize the profit of the card network. Section 4 computes the fixed per-transaction card fees.
Section 5 compares equilibrium market allocations under proportional fees and fixed pertransaction fees. Section 6 incorporates card annual fees into the analysis. Section 7 concludes with some policy discussions and other applications.
The Model
We study a simple model of a payment card system illustrated in Figure 2 . Consumers use a payment card to pay merchants. Merchants submit charges to a card network which then bills consumers. For the purpose of this paper we deliberately abstract from the internal organization of card networks which consist of merchant acquirers who receive requests for payments from merchants, and card issuers who bill consumers and send the money to merchant acquirers who then pay the merchants. 9 
Consumers
Consumers buy two types of goods. Let  denote the consumption of goods for which consumers pay only with cash (cash goods in what follows). Let  denote the consumption 9 There is no loss of generality with this simplification because considering additional players within card networks would further enhance card networks' incentive to charge proportional fees. 10 Consumers' utility function is assumed to take the quasi-linear form given by
The price of card goods is denoted by   . The price of cash goods is normalized to unity. Consumers' budget constraint is given by
where  denotes consumers' exogenously-given income.
Substituting (2) for  in (1), and maximizing with respect to  obtains consumers' isoelastic demand for card goods
The price consumers pay for card goods   is composed of two parts: (a) the retail price charged by merchants, denoted by  , and (b) a consumer card fee charged by the card network denoted by   . The consumer card fee could be proportional to the price or a fixed per-transaction fee. 11 For consumers, the overall price they pay for card goods is
Merchants
There are  ≥ 1 merchants who sell card goods. Each merchant obtains the goods at a unit cost  and sells them at a retail price  . The card network charges merchants a card fee   .
Let   denote the output sold by merchant . Then, the total cost borne by each
Each merchant  sets the output level   taking the output by competing merchants  − =  −   as given, and maximizes profit given by
where  can be extracted from (3) and (4), and expressed as a function of (    − ).
The card network and timing
The card network is assumed to incur a fixed cost  for processing each card transaction. 12 The profit earned by the card network is therefore
The following two sections solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium of the following two-stage game:
Stage I. The card network chooses card fees   and   to maximize profit (7).
Stage II. Each merchant takes card fees   and   as given and chooses output level   to maximize profit (6) , where in this stage output levels must satisfy the Nash-Cournot outcome.
Proportional Card Fees
We first consider proportional card fees. Notice that the equilibrium market allocation is unique up to a combination of   and   in the two-sided card market that we consider.
Therefore, without loss of generality, we set   = 0 in the following analysis. 13 The consumer demand for card goods (3) becomes
The cost borne by each merchant is already given in the top row of (5).
In Stage II, each merchant  takes  − as given and chooses output   to solve
where the price  was substituted from (8).
The first-order condition for the profit maximization problem (9) yields
In a symmetric Nash-Cournot equilibrium all merchants sell the same amount, so that
Therefore, the total merchant output,   = , and market price   are
where the superscript "pr" stands for proportional card fees. As expected, the equilibrium price (output) increases (decreases) with the merchant card fee   .
In Stage I, the card network takes the merchant equilibrium (10) as given and chooses the merchant card fee   to solve
which yields the merchant card fee
The resulting equilibrium profit of the card network is therefore
The equilibrium price and total merchant output can be computed from (10) to be
Substituting (14) into (9) for   =    yields the total profit of all merchants
Adding up (13) and (15) yields the sum of card network and merchant profits
Substituting (14) into consumers' utility function (1) and (2) obtains the equilibrium consumer utility
Altogether, the total social welfare (defined as the sum of consumer utility, merchant and card network profits) is given by
We now investigate the effects of changing the degree of competition among merchants. Proof. Equations (13) The findings in Result 1 can be explained as follows. Although this paper investigates a two-sided payment card market, much of the intuition can be derived from a one-sided market analogy. The card network can be viewed as an upstream firm that charges the downstream merchants a proportional fee   for card services. The downstream merchants then take   as given, and sell the final goods to consumers at price  . When  = 1, both the upstream and downstream markets are monopolized, in which case we have the classic "double marginalization" problem. As  increases, the downstream market becomes more competitive, which mitigates the double marginalization effect.
Consequently, this decreases the profit of downstream merchants but increases the profit of the upstream card network. Altogether, the sum of card network and merchant profits are higher, so are consumer utility and social welfare.
Fixed Per-transaction Card Fees
Suppose now the card network sets fixed per-transaction fees that are independent of the price of goods. Again, without loss of generality, we set   = 0 and the consumer demand for card goods becomes
The cost borne by each merchant is given in the bottom row of (5).
In Stage II, each merchant  ( = 1 2     ) takes  − as given and chooses output level   to solve
The first-order condition for a maximum yields
In a symmetric Nash-Cournot equilibrium   =  for each merchant . Therefore, the total merchant output,   = , and market price   are
where the superscript "fix" denotes for fixed per-transaction card fees.
In Stage I, the card network takes the merchant equilibrium (20) as given and chooses the merchant card fee   to solve
yielding the merchant card fee
Therefore, the equilibrium profit of the card network is
The equilibrium price and total merchant output can be computed from (20) to be
and
The total profit earned by all merchants is
Adding up (23) and (25) yields the sum of card network and merchant profits
In view of consumers' utility function (1) and (2), equilibrium consumer utility is
Summing up, the total social welfare is given by
Finally, note that Result 1 for the proportional card fee case applies also to the fixed per-transaction fee case, and will therefore not be repeated here. To see this note that equations (23)- (28) imply that Π
   0 and     0.
Comparing Proportional and Fixed Card Fees
We now approach our main investigation which is to explain why card networks impose proportional fees rather than fixed per-transaction fees.
Result 2. (13) and (23) 
Proof. (a) Equations
Result 3(a) explains why merchant associations complain about proportional fees and lobby for fixed per-transaction fees. Result 3(b) suggests that merchants' incentives to lobby for fixed per-transaction fees tend to increase with market concentration.
Results 2 and 3 are illustrated in Figure 3 . The figure shows that the card network earns a higher profit under proportional fees compared with fixed per-transaction fees, but merchants earn lower profits. As the number of competing merchants increases, card network profit increases and merchant profits decrease under both types of fees. In addition, for both the card network and merchants, the difference in profits between the two types of fees decreases with the number of merchants. 
Result 4 shows that the equilibrium market allocation under proportional fees generates a higher sum of card network and merchant profits and also generates higher consumer utility and social welfare compared with fixed per-transaction fees. Also, these differences diminish with the degree of competition among merchants, as illustrated in Figure 4 . Finally, the following Result 5 shows that there is no difference between proportional fees and fixed per-transaction fees when the merchant market is perfectly competitive.
Result 5.
When the merchant market is perfectly competitive, proportional fees and fixed pertransaction fees yield the same market outcome. Formally,
 all converge to zero as the number of merchants  goes to infinity.
Proof. Follows equations (13)- (18) and (23)
Intuitively, our findings can be explained as follows. When the merchant market is monopolized ( = 1), there are two monopolies in the vertical card payment system, the card network being the upstream monopoly and the merchant being the downstream monopoly. They both charge a markup over marginal cost, which causes the "double marginalization" problem. As it turns out, in the presence of double marginalization, the upstream monopoly can better restrain the market power of the downstream monopoly by charging proportional fees. As a result, the card network earns a higher profit at the expense of the merchant under proportional fees. Also, the sum of card network and merchant profits, consumer utility and social welfare are all higher than those under fixed per-transaction fees.
As the number of merchants  increases, the downstream merchant market becomes more competitive, which mitigates the double marginalization problem. Consequently, under both types of fees, the sum of profits of upstream and downstream firms as well as consumer utility and social welfare all increase. However, the differences between proportional fees and fixed per-transaction fees diminish. Ultimately, the differences vanish as the number of merchants goes to infinity because the double marginalization problem gets eliminated.
Card Annual Fees
A natural extension of our analysis would be to incorporate card annual fees into the model. Some payment cards require cardholders to pay a lump-sum annual fee. In our framework, the annual fee could be viewed as a "two-part tariff" that card service providers use in order to extract a higher surplus from cardholders.
First, note that in the absence of card services, consumers' utility function (1) and (2) imply that consumers spend all their income on cash goods and gain utility  = . In contrast, the availability of card services allows consumers to achieve a higher utility level.
In theory, a monopoly card service provider should be able to extract the entire consumer surplus from card usage by charging cardholders a lump-sum annual fee. Incorporating card annual fees into the model implies that the card network would then maximize its overall profits, which is the sum of profits generated from merchant fees and cardholder annual fees. As before, the merchant fee could be either proportional to the transaction value or a fixed per-transaction fee, whereas the cardholder annual fee is intended to capture the remaining consumer surplus from card usage.
Extending our model to allowing the card network to charge cardholders annual fees Finally, it should be noted that the card annual fee would be reduced from the monopoly level if card service providers were subjected to competition. For example, incumbent card service providers may want to keep their annual fees low in order to maintain their cardholder base and deter entry from potential competitors.
Additional Discussions
This paper explains why payment card networks charge fees that are proportional to the transaction values instead of charging fixed per-transaction fees. The theory shows that, when card networks and merchants both have market power, card networks earn higher profits by charging proportional fees. Merchants earn lower profits under proportional fees whereas consumer utility and social welfare are higher. These findings explain the existing payment card fee structure and shed light on related policy debates.
Our analysis shows that card networks with market power charge a markup over marginal cost, so the resulting market allocation may deviate from the social optimum.
This concerns policymakers in many countries, who try to align payment card fees with the cost basis. While it may be difficult to directly regulate card fee levels, it seems natural and easy to regulate card fee structures, such as requiring fixed per-transaction fees for payment cards that incur only a fixed cost per transaction (e.g., debit cards and prepaid cards). However, our analysis suggests that if card networks have market power and merchants are perfectly competitive, then imposing a fixed per-transaction fee only would not affect the market outcome. Moreover, when merchants also have market power, a regulation like this may indeed increase merchant profits but at the expense of card networks and consumers, and is also likely to reduce total social welfare.
Therefore, caution should be taken by policymakers who consider intervening in payment card markets.
14 It should be noted that our analysis has abstracted from the argument whether card fees fulfill a special balancing purpose in two-sided markets because we believe that our findings should be useful to all researchers, those who believe that card fees play such a role, and those who argue that they don't and that all fees should be cost based.
While the paper studies the payment card industry, our analysis makes more general contribution to the broader industrial organization literature by studying the effects of pricing structures in vertically related industries, and by considering two-sided markets.
Some of our results may also shed light on general public finance taxation issues, such as the efficiency of proportional tax versus flat tax.
14 See Wang (2010b) for more discussions on regulating card fee structures versus fee levels.
